Question on Performative Language

Tim. Thanks for your excellent comments. For some reason I cannot post on my site, so I am responding here.

The question I have relates to the distinction between the being of the Word, the knowing of the Word, and what the Word does. What exactly is this relationship? Does what the Word does determine the being of the Word, or simply our knowing of it?

Even if we know the answer to this, however, we are still faced with the question of the identity conditions of what the Word does. How exactly do we know that life is communicated by the Word, (in spite of the fact of death), when we cannot know what would count as the ontological contour of such life? What does it mean exactly for the Word to do?

Sometimes things are very obvious until we start to think about them really hard. If I cannot specify the precise conditions under which life and forgiveness are decidedly not communicated, how can I know for sure when they are? This is a general problem for all who want to think deeply about the hidden nature of faith and salvation.

Dennis

Thanks for your excellent post!

Signum Philosophicum

I am seeking to understand more clearly the common claim that theological language must be understood primarily donationally, a view espoused paradigmatically by Ebeling and adopted in the tradition of hermeneutical theology. In the following post I am responding specifically to Bayer who connects the claim to Austin's use of a performative utterance. See here. I am, as always, deeply interested in theological conversation.